What explains the stock market's reaction to Federal Reserve policy? by Ben Bernanke & Kenneth N. Kuttner
What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to
Federal Reserve Policy?
Ben S. Bernanke Kenneth N. Kuttner∗
February 7, 2003
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of unanticipated changes in the Federal funds target
on equity prices, with the aim of both estimating the size of the typical reaction, and
understanding the reasons for the market’s response. On average over the May 1989
to December 2001 sample, a “typical” unanticipated 25 basis point rate cut has been
associated with a 1.3 percent increase in the S&P 500 composite index. The estimated
response varies considerably across industries, with the greatest sensitivity observed
in cyclical industries like construction, and the smallest in mining and utilities. Very
little of the market’s reaction can be attributed to policy’s effects on the real rate of
interest or future dividends, however. Instead, most of the response of the current
excess return on equities can be traced to policy’s impact on expected future excess
returns. JEL codes: E44, G12.
1 Introduction
The reactionof thestockmarket tomonetarypolicyisclearly a topicof intenseinterestboth
to market participants and policymakers. Those holding equities would obviously like to
know how possible Federal Reserve actions might affect the value of their portfolios. Sim-
ilarly, an estimate of the likely effect of policy on asset prices is an important ingredient in
assessing the transmission of monetary policy through the “wealth effect.” The size of and
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1reasons for the market’s response to policy are not yet clearly understood, however, in part
because of the interdependence between asset prices, monetary policy, and macroeconomic
conditions.
The overallgoal of this paper is to analyze the reaction of equity prices to monetary pol-
icy, using a market-based measure of unanticipated policy actions to isolate more cleanly
the effects of policy. One speciﬁc objective is to document and quantify the stock market’s
response to monetarypolicyactions, both in the aggregateand for a variety of industryclas-
siﬁcations. A second objective is to determine the reasons for the stock market’s response,
i.e., the extent to which the reaction can be traced to the impact of policy on (expectations
of) future real interest rates and dividends.
Estimating the response of equity prices to monetary policy actions is not as easy as it
may seem, however, as the market is unlikely to respond to policy actions that were already
anticipated. Distinguishing between expected and unexpected policy actions is therefore
essential for discerning their effects. A natural way to do this is to use the technique pro-
posed by Kuttner (2001), which uses Fed funds futures data to construct a measure of
“surprise” rate changes.1 Explaining the market’s response is harder still, as it requires
an assessment of how those policy surprises affect expectations of future interest rates and
excess returns. To do this, we adapt the procedure developed by Campbell (1991) and
Campbell and Ammer (1993), which uses a vector autoregression (VAR) to calculate revi-
sions in expectations of future interest rates, stock returns, and dividends.
The results presented in section 2 of the paper show that the market does indeed react
strongly to surprise funds rate changes. For those days on which funds rate target was
changed, the S&P500 registers a gain of roughly 1.3 percent in response to a surprise 25
1Alternatives measures exist: Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) propose using the change in term eurodollar
rates, while Rigobonand Sack (2002)utilize the eurodollarfutures rate. While these measures provideuseful
gauges of interest rate expectations over a slightly longer horizon, G¨ urkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002)
show that Fed funds futures do the best job of forecasting target rate changes at a one- to ﬁve-month horizon.
2basis point easing. The market reacts little, if at all, to the component of funds rate changes
that are anticipated by futures market participants. The market’s response to surprise policy
actions varies considerably across industries, however, with the largest response in the
construction sector. Mining, utilities and wholesale trade show little response.
Section 3takes upthequestionofwhat explainsequityprices’response. It turnsoutthat
only a small portion of equities’ excess return variance can be explained by the effects of
real interest rates or dividends; most is attributed to the induced time variation in expected
excess equity returns. So while an unanticipated rate cut generates an immediate increase
in equity prices, it is followed by an extended period of lower-than-normal excess returns.
One interpretation of this result is that monetary policy surprises are for some reason asso-
ciated with changes in the equity premium. But in the absence of a fully-developed asset
pricing model, it is impossibleto distinguishthis interpretation from a market overreaction.
Naturally,thisisnottheﬁrst papertodealwiththeconnectionbetween monetarypolicy,
equity prices, and the macroeconomic environment. One recent paper is by Rigobon and
Sack (2002), who estimated the contemporaneous impact of monetary policy on bond and
stock prices using a novel estimator exploiting the heteroskedasticity introduced by unex-
pected policyactions. Other papers in this veininclude Jensen, Johnsonand Mercer (1996),
Jensen and Mercer (1998), who examined the disaggregated response of stock prices to
changes in the discount rate. Boyd, Jagannathan and Hu (2001) focused on equity prices’
response to unemployment news, rather than monetary policy; but their explanation for the
market’s “perverse” reaction (i.e., the association of higher-than-expected unemployment
with increases in equity prices) has to do with the presumed response of monetary policy.
Goto and Valkanov (2000) examined the policy-induced covariance between equity prices
and inﬂation, using policy shocks obtained from a conventional identiﬁed vector autore-
gression (VAR) model. Taking a less structured approach, Fair (2002) identiﬁed the largest
changes in equity prices at 1- to 5-minute intervals, and found that nearly one-third of those
3were associated with news about monetary policy. For the most part, however, these papers
have focused narrowly on the question of how the market responds, rather than why; our
aim is to address both of these issues within a single framework.
2 Equities’ reaction to target rate changes
This section focuses on the immediate impact of monetary policy on equity prices, both
for broad stock market indices, and for individual industries. As noted in the introduc-
tion, however, one difﬁculty inherent in measuring policy’s effects is that asset markets are
forward looking, and hence tend to incorporate any information about anticipated policy
changes. Some effort is therefore required to isolate the unexpected, or “surprise” policy
change which might plausibly generate a market response. This does not say that asset
prices respond to monetary policy only when the Fed surprises the markets, of course. Nat-
urally, asset prices will also respond to revisions in expectations about future policy, which
in turn may be driven by news about changing economic conditions. Unexpected policy
actions merely represent convenient “natural experiments” which allow us to gauge the
market reaction.
One convenient, market-based way to identify unexpected funds rate changes relies on
the prices of Fed funds futures contracts, which embody expectations of the effective Fed
funds rate, averaged over the settlementmonth.2 Krueger and Kuttner (1996) found that the
Fed fundsfuturesrates dida goodjobofforecasting, efﬁcientlyincorporatingavailabledata
on the likely policy actions. Kuttner (2001) subsequently used this approach to estimate
the response of the term structure to monetary policy. The analysis in this section uses a
similar approach to gauging the response of equity prices to unanticipated changes in the
Fed funds rate from June 1989 through December 2001. A parallel set of results is then
2The Federal funds rate was either implicitly or explicitly the operating instrument of Federal Reserve
policy over the period analyzed.
4presented using policy surprises deﬁned at a monthly frequency.
2.1 Measuring the surprise element of policy actions
A measure of the surprise element of any speciﬁc change in the Fed funds target (which
was either implicitly or explicitly the operating instrument of Federal Reserve policy over
the period analyzed) can be derived from the change in the futures contract’s price relative
to the day prior to the policy action. Speciﬁcally, the “surprise” target rate change can
be calculated as the change in the “spot month” (i.e., for the month in which the target is
changed) Fed funds futures rate on the day of the rate change, scaled up by a factor related











where ˆ ru is the unexpected target rate change, f 0
s,t is the spot-month futures rate on day t of
month s, and m is the number of days in the month.3 The expected component of the rate
change is simply deﬁned as the actual minus the surprise, or
∆ ˆ re
t = ∆ ˆ rt −∆ ˆ ru
t . (2)
Getting the timing right is crucial for the analysis of daily data. Before 1994, when the
Fed began announcing changes in the funds rate target, markets generally became aware of
policy actions on the day after the decision, when it was implemented by the open market
desk. Any funds rate surprises, therefore, are assumed to have occurred on the day after the
FOMC’s decision.
December 18 1990, is an exception to this rule, however. On that day, the Fed took the
unusual step of announcing a 50 basis point cut in the discount rate immediately following
3As discussed in Kuttner (2001), when the rate change comes on the ﬁrst day of the month, f 1
s−1,m would
be used instead of f 0
s,t−1. Also, to avoid amplifying any month-end noise, when the rate change falls on one
of the last three days of the month, the unscaled change one-month futures rate is used instead of the change
in the spot month rate.
5the FOMC meeting, this was widely (and correctly) interpreted as signaling a 25 bp funds
rate cut. The decision was public at 3:30 p.m., after the close of the futures market, but
before the close of the stock market.4 Because of this unusual timing, the funds rate cut is
assumed to have occurred on the 18th, and the difference between the opening future rate
on the 19th and the closing rate on the 18th is used to calculate the surprise.
The announcement of target rate changes, which began in February 1994, eliminates
anomalieslikethat of December 18, 1990. Because the change in thetarget rate isgenerally
announced prior to the close of the futures market, the futures rate generally incorporates
any news about monetary policy. But the post-1994 period also includes one occasion
— October 15, 1998 — on which an action was announced after the close of the futures
markets. Consequently, the difference between the opening rate on the 16th and the closing
rate on the 15th is used to calculate the surprise.
2.2 A word on endogeneity
An important issue in this analysis is that of endogeneity, which could arise from three
distinct sources. One possible source would be a direct response of monetary policy to
stock market ﬂuctuations. Empirical work on the Federal Reserve’s reaction function has
generally failed to ﬁnd such a response, however. [See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999).]
A second possiblesource of endogeneity is a jointresponse of policyand the stock mar-
ket to new information. For example, the release of data indicating weaker-than-expected
economic growth might plausibly lead to both a decline in the stock market, and to a cut
in the target Fed funds rate. This is probably not an issue for surprises measured at a daily
frequency, however, as a same-day response by the FOMC to new information would be
highly unlikely. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the surprises deﬁned in this way as mon-
4See Wessel (1990).
6etary policy “shocks,” in the sense that they do not incorporate an endogenous reaction to
macroeconomic developments.5 The September 17, 2001 rate cut is an important excep-
tion, however: the market’s sharp decline and the Fed’s 50 bp rate cut were both (at least in
part) responses to the preceding week’s terrorist attacks. A similar co-movement would be
observed if market participants believed the Fed’s policy actions incorporated a response to
private information. Stocks could fall on a rate cut, for example, if investors inferred from
the Fed’s actions that the economy was weaker than they had previously thought.
If any form of endogeneitywere present, then an instrumentalvariables procedure, such
as the heteroskedasticity-based estimator proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2002), would be
required to obtain an unbiased estimate. However it is important to note that to the extent
that this endogeneity exists, it would tend introduce a downward bias in the stock market’s
estimated response to monetary policy. And in any case, our results do not depend on the
assumption that the FOMC bases its decision on publicly released data. Our approach is
still valid, even if measured funds rate surprises include a response to private information
— and indeed it provides some insight into what that information might be. Consequently,
we need not take a stand on whether these surprises move markets because they represent
true policy shocks, or because they reveal private information.
2.3 Results for rate change days
We start by documenting the effects of surprise policy actions on various measures of stock
prices. A scatterplot of the one-day percentage change in the S&P 500 composite index
against the Fed funds surprises appears in ﬁgure 1, for those days on which the funds rate
target was changed. A negative correlation is clearly evident: negative surprises (unantic-
ipated rate cuts) are associated with stock market rallies, and positive surprises (unantici-
5Faust, Swanson and Wright (2002) exploit this insight, and use it to derive an alternative identiﬁcation
scheme for monetary VARs.
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pated rate hikes) with declines.
One outlier in the southwestquadrant is conspicuous, however: an observationin which
a sharp decline in equity prices accompanied a surprise rate cut. It turns out that this
anomalous observation to corresponds to September 17, 2001 — the ﬁrst trading day after
the September 11 terrorist attacks. In this instance, the comovement clearly reﬂects the
jointreaction ofpolicyandthe stockmarkettoan exogenousshock, rather thanthemarket’s
response to the Fed. This observation, therefore, is dropped from the analysis.
The ﬁrst two lines of table 1 report the impact of unexpected policy actions on two
broad measures of stock prices: the S&P 500 and the CRSP value-weighted index. The
effect is estimated from a regression of the one-day log return (in percentage terms) on
the anticipated and unanticipated components of the change in the Fed funds target (also
expressed in percentage terms), i.e.,
∆ pt = α +β 1∆ ˆ re
t +β 2∆ ˆ ru
t +ut , (3)
8Table 1: The response of equity prices to funds rate changes
Response to target change:
Index anticipated unanticipated ¯ R2 SE ﬁrms
S&P 500 composite 1.39 −5.29 0.26 1.17 500
(2.20)( 4.34)
CRSP value weighted 1.42 −5.36 0.28 1.12 varies
(2.34)( 4.59)
CRSP manufacturing 0.66 −4.11 0.18 1.06 54
(1.15)( 3.72)
CRSP ﬁnancial 0.98 −4.94 0.20 1.24 47
(1.45)( 3.82)
CRSP information 1.48 −6.37 0.23 1.50 26
(1.83)( 4.09)
CRSP construction −0.44 −9.34 0.17 2.61 2
(0.31)( 3.43)
CRSP retail 1.10 −6.29 0.17 1.68 19
(1.21)( 3.59)
CRSP wholesale 0.02 −1.01 −0.02 1.01 6
(0.03)( 0.96)
CRSP transportation 0.93 −5.23 0.12 1.69 8
(1.01)( 2.96)
CRSP utilities −0.25 0.55 −0.03 1.11 28
(0.42)( 0.48)
CRSP services 1.19 −4.74 0.16 1.35 18
(1.63)( 3.37)
CRSP mining 0.34 −1.13 −0.03 1.40 17
(0.44)( 0.78)
Notes: Parentheses contain t-statistics. The sample includes the 54 target rate changes from June
1989 through December 2001, excluding the observation corresponding to September 17, 2001.
The dependent variable is the one-day log return, excluding dividends, expressed in percent. The
unanticipated and anticipated components of the change in the Fed funds rate are given by equations
1 and 2, and are expressed in percent. The column labeled “ﬁrms” gives the number of ﬁrms in each
portfolio. The regressions also include an intercept (not reported).
9where pt is the logarithm of the stock price. As in ﬁgure 1, the sample consists of those
days on which the target rate was changed.6 The (highly signiﬁcant) estimated coefﬁcient
on the surprise of −5.29 implies a surprise 25 basis point rate cut typically leads to a 1.3
percent gain in the index.7
Consistent with the efﬁcient markets hypothesis, the market responds much more
strongly to surprises than expected actions: the coefﬁcient on the expected component
is statistically signiﬁcant, but small in magnitude (and has the “wrong” sign).8 The R2 is
also noteworthy, as it implies that 28 percent of the variance in equity prices on the days
of funds rate changes is associated with monetary policy actions. The reaction is all the
more remarkable, given that much of the Fed funds surprises measured at a daily frequency
represent shocks to the timing or rate changes, rather than to the medium-term path of in-
terest rates.9 The stock market’s generally enthusiastic response to the eleven rate cuts in
2001 (several of which were at least partly unanticipated) is consistent with this pattern. In-
deed, the estimated reaction is smaller and less signiﬁcant when 2001 is excluded, although
statistical tests do not reject the hypothesis that the coefﬁcient has remained constant.
To analyze the response of individual industries, we turn to portfolios constructed from
CRSP stock returns, grouped according to primary NAICS code into ten indices: infor-
mation technology, construction, services, manufacturing, ﬁnancial, retail, transportation,
wholesale trade, utilities, and mining. The remaining ten rows of table 1 report the re-
6An alternative would be to use the sample consisting of possible rate change days, such as those corre-
spondingto meetings of the FOMC. Estimates based on FOMC meeting days are much less precise, however,
as surprise actions at FOMC meetings have been relatively uncommon in recent years.
7Using their proposed heteroskedasticity-based IV procedure, Rigobon and Sack (2002) report a coefﬁ-
cient of −7.1 from an analogous regression. However that study used a measure of the policy surprise based
on Eurodollar futures, rather than Fed funds futures, and it is this difference that accounts for much of the
discrepancy.
8The market’s non-reactionto anticipated policy actions is consistent with reportingin the ﬁnancial press:
after the January 31 2001 50 bp rate cut, a headline in the Wall Street Journal read, “With the Rate Cut
Anticipated, Market’s Reaction Is Anticlimactic.” [Zuckerman, (2001).]
9This “timing hypothesis” was suggested by Kuttner (2001) as a likely explanation for the smaller-than-
expected response of interest rates to Fed funds surprises. Some support for this view can be found in the
results of Demiralp and Jord´ a (2002) and G¨ urkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002).
10sults from estimating equation 3 on these ten industry portfolios. (The table also reports
the number of ﬁrms in each portfolio.) Not surprisingly, the largest coefﬁcient is obtained
in the construction sector, whose stock price reaction is nearly twice that of the broader
market indices. The information and retail sectors also respond somewhat more strongly
than the market as a whole. Little or no response is observed among stocks in mining and
utility sectors, which are usually considered relatively acyclical. Not surprisingly, these
sectors are also characterized by very small (or negative) ¯ R2s, reﬂecting the predominance
of idiosyncratic factors in these ﬁrms’ stock returns.
2.4 The reaction measured at monthly intervals
An alternative way to deﬁne the policy surprise is to focus on the expected change in policy
at a regular, monthlyhorizon. Unlikethe dailyeventstudy-styleanalysis, the regular timing
is amenable to the time series approach employed below in section 3 to assess the causes
of the market’s response. One important feature of this approach is that any month could
potentially contain a surprise policy action; another is that policy inaction could also create
a surprise. These two features make this approach less susceptible to any sample selection
issues that might arise in an analysis of rate change days.
A slightly different method is used to derive a monthly measure of unanticipated policy
actions. Since the price of the Fed funds futures contract is based on the monthly average
Fed funds rate, the appropriate deﬁnition would be









where ˆ rs,i is the funds rate target day i of month s, and f 1
s−1,m is the rate corresponding to
the one-month futures contract on the last (mth) day of month s−1.10 The expected funds
10The settlement price of the Fed funds futures contract is determined by the average over the calendar
month, carrying the prior business day’s rate over to weekends and holidays.
11rate change is deﬁned analogously as
¯ ∆ ˆ re
s ≡ f1
s−1,m− ˆ rs−1,m . (5)
The sum of the two is the average funds rate target in month s minus the target on the
last day of month s−1. (Since this is not the ﬁrst difference of either the average or the
month-end funds rate target, the slightly non-standard notation ¯ ∆ is used.)
One caveat to this approach that the endogeneity issue discussed above in section 2.2
is more relevant to Fed funds surprises deﬁned at a monthly interval, than it was for the
day-ahead surprises. Rate changes unanticipated as of the end of the prior month may well
include a systematic response to economic news, such as employment, output and inﬂation.
Consequently, it is important to bear in mind that these “surprises” do not correspond to
the monetary policy “shocks” as the term is used in the monetary VAR literature.
This deﬁnition of the funds rate surprise also raises a new issue: that of time aggre-
gation. The (unavoidable) reliance on the average funds rate will attenuate the size of the
policy surprises, a problem discussed in detail in Evans and Kuttner (1998). Unfortunately,
without making speciﬁc assumptions about the days of possible rate changes, there is no
clean way to correct for this problem.11 Consequently, some caution is required when
interpreting the magnitude of the surprises measured in this way.
Figure 2 plots the monthly change in the S&P 500 composite against the monthly sur-
prises deﬁned in this way. As in the daily data, a strong negative correlation is evident;
and here too the September 2001 outlier is visible. As discussed above, it makes sense to
drop this observation from the analysis, as it represents the common response of monetary
policy and the stock market to extraordinary news.
The sample used for the analysis contains a number of very sharp stock price move-
11After the 1994 change in protocol, for a time it seemed reasonable to assume that actions were expected
only at scheduled FOMC meetings; but the three intermeeting rate cuts in 2001 have made that assumption
less plausible.
12Table 2: The response of equity prices at a monthly frequency
Response to target change:
Index anticipated unanticipated ¯ R2 SE DW
S&P 500 composite −1.54 −10.49 0.077 3.63 2.25
(0.53)( 3.78)
CRSP value weighted −1.66 −9.21 0.073 3.40 2.27
(0.64)( 3.69)
CRSP manufacturing −3.13 −11.57 0.081 3.92 2.24
(1.01)( 3.87)
CRSP ﬁnancial −0.05 −11.87 0.045 5.28 2.28
(0.01)( 2.95)
CRSP information −1.00 −12.55 0.074 4.46 2.30
(0.28)( 2.85)
CRSP construction −3.83 −26.23 0.065 9.83 1.78
(0.49)( 3.50)
CRSP retail −8.87 −12.62 0.070 5.10 1.94
(2.19)( 3.24)
CRSP wholesale −1.72 −5.15 0.003 4.23 2.44
(0.52)( 1.60)
CRSP transportation −6.17 −9.70 0.022 5.96 2.09
(1.31)( 2.14)
CRSP utilities −4.34 −4.82 0.008 4.24 2.09
(1.29)( 1.49)
CRSP services −3.19 −11.81 0.058 4.66 1.94
(0.86)( 3.32)
CRSP mining −4.45 −3.11 −0.007 6.74 2.16
(0.83)( 0.60)
Notes: Parentheses contain t-statistics. The dependent variable is the monthly log return, excluding
dividends, expressed in percent. The unanticipated and anticipated components of the change in
the Fed funds rate are given by equations 4 and 5, and are expressed in percent. The regressions
also include an intercept (not reported). The sample includes 149 observations spanning May 1989
through December 2001, excluding August 1990, August 1998, and September 2001.
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ments, at least two of which were in response to clearly identiﬁable adverse exogenous
events. One is the 9.4 percent decline in the S&P 500 index in response to Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait in August 1990; the second is the 14.6 percent drop in the wake of Russia’s
August 1998 default. Neither event prompted an immediate Fed reaction, however, and
consequently neither generated a perverse, positive co-movement between the funds rate
and stock prices. But they nonetheless add lot of noise to the equity return process: along
with the 8.2 percent decline in September 2001, these two observations account for 18 per-
cent of the monthly variance in the return on the S&P 500 since mid-1989. Consequently,
we opt to treat these as outliers, and drop them from the analysis.12
Table 2 reports the results from a regression of the monthly percentage change in equity
prices on the expected and unexpected components of monthly funds rate changes. The
top two rows again show the response of the S&P 500 and CRSP value-weighted indices.
12The parameter estimates turn out to be virtually identical with these months included, but there is a
modest loss of precision.
14As in the results using daily data, there is a strong, statistically signiﬁcant response to
unanticipated rate changes, and little or no response to the anticipated actions. The ¯ R2
indicates that a respectable seven to eight percent of the variance of monthly stock price
ﬂuctuations (excluding the three “outlier” months) can be traced to policy surprises. The
size and statistical signiﬁcance of these estimates appear quite stable over the sample.
It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the response is nearly twice that found in
analysis of rate-change days. This difference in magnitudes is readily explained by the time
aggregation issue discussed above, however. In fact, if funds rate changes on average take
place in the middle of the month (for example, if rate changes were distributed uniformly
over the days of the month), then the magnitude of the estimated monthly surprises will be
attenuated by one-half, and this would explain the doubling of the estimated response of
the stock price.
The pattern of responses across industries, shownin the remaining ten rows of the table,
is similar to that observed in the daily data. Again, constructionexhibitsthe largest reaction
(two to three times that of the broad market index), while the coefﬁcients for wholesale
trade, mining, and utilities are relatively small, and statistically insigniﬁcant.
3 Policy, fundamentals and stock prices
Section 2 above documented the reaction of equity returns to surprise monetary policy
actions. We now turn to the speciﬁc question posed in the paper title, namely what explains
the observed reaction. There are several reasons why an unexpected funds rate increase
may lead to a decline in stock prices: it may be because of a decline in expected future
dividends, an increase in the expected real interest rate used to discount those dividends,
or it may increase the expected excess return (i.e., the equity premium) associated with
holding stocks. Simple regressions of equity returns on surprise changes in the funds rate
15target are silent on the question; a more structured approach is required to disentangle the
various effects.
The approach in this paper is an adaptation of the method used by Campbell (1991),
and Campbell and Ammer (1993). In brief, the ﬁrst element of their method is a log-linear
decomposition of excess equity returns into components attributable to news about real
rates, dividends, and future excess returns; the second element is the use of a vector au-
toregression (VAR) to calculate the relevant expectations.13 We take the Campbell-Ammer
framework one step further, however, by relating these components in turn to the news
about the path of monetary policy embodied in the surprises derived from Fed funds fu-
tures. This allows us to estimate the impact of Fed funds surprises on expected future
dividends, real interest rates, and expected future excess returns. It turns out that the largest
(and only statistically signiﬁcant) effect is on the future excess return component, suggest-
ing that it is this — and not expected future dividends or real interest rates — that accounts
for the observed reaction of equity prices.
The object of this analysis is the (log) excess return on equities, denoted yt+1. This
is deﬁned as the total return on equities (price change plus dividends), minus the risk-free
rate (taken to be the one-month Treasury bill yield). The return dated t +1 is measured
over period t, i.e., from the beginning of period t to the beginning of period t +1. Let
e
y
t+1 represent the unexpected (relative to expectations formed at the beginning of period t)
excess return during period t, i.e., yt+1−Etyt+1.
Using the linearization developed by Campbell and Shiller (1988), the period t unex-
pected excess return on equity can be expressed in terms of the revision the expectation of
discounted future dividends, the real interest rate, and future excess returns. (A sketch of
13Because VARs require periodic time series data, the subsequent analysis will use the monthly measure
of the funds rate surprises.
16the derivation can be found in the appendix.) The decomposition can be written as:
e
y





where the es represent the revision in expectations between periodst and t+1, and the tilde




















The ρ discount factor, which comes out of the linearization, represents the steady-state
ratio of the equity price to the price plus dividend; following Campbell and Ammer (1993),
this is set to 0.9962. As emphasized by Campbell (1991), equation 6 is really nothing
more than a dynamic accounting identity relating the current excess return to revisions in
expectations. As such, it contains no real economic content, much less any speciﬁc asset
pricing model; such a model would be required to provide a link between the conditional
expectations of future returns and economic variables (e.g., consumption).
Implementing this decomposition obviously requires empirical proxies for the expecta-
tions appearing in equation 6. The approach of Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer
(1993) is to model expectations using a Vector Autoregression (VAR) involving the vari-
ables of interest (excess returns and the real interest rate) along with any other indicators
that might be helpful in forecasting those variables. Calculating the discounted sum of
the revisions in expectations is straightforward; to do so involves requires writing the n
variable, p lag VAR as a ﬁrst-order system,
zt+1 = Azt +ε t+1 , (7)
17where zt+1 is an appropriately stacked np×1 vector containing the excess equity return,
the real interest rate, and any additional indicators. With the VAR expressed in this form,
the ingredients of the identity 6 are given by
e
y
t+1 = syε t+1 ,
˜ e
y
t+1 = syρ A(1−ρ A)−1ε t+1 ,
˜ er








where sy and sr are appropriate 1×npselection matrices.
Two features of the Campbell-Ammer method deserve further comment. One is its
parametric approach to constructing long-horizon expectations of stock returns: one has to
assumethat the dynamicsof equityreturns manyyears in the future are adequately captured
by a parsimonious VAR model. To a large extent, this parametric approach is forced upon
us, as the relatively short (12-year) experience with Fed funds futures is not sufﬁcient to
directly estimate the long-horizon impact on stock asset returns, particularly in light of
the questionable small-sample properties of long-horizon regressions [see Nelson and Kim
(1993)]. But as discussed below, the use of the VAR does allow us to estimate the dynamics
of stock returns over a longer sample than the period for which futures data are available.
A second important feature of the approach is that dividends are not included explicitly






t+1 is backed out from the identity
(6). In principle, it would be possible to forecast dividends directly in the VAR, and instead
back out an implied ˜ e
y
t+1. In practice, however, this is complicated by a strong seasonal
pattern, and a root near unity in the dividend process. It is important to note that to the
extent that the VAR understates the predictability of excess returns, treating dividends as a
residual means that the method will end up attributing too much of the return volatility to
18dividends.14
3.1 The forecasting VAR
The ﬁrst step is to set up a VAR to capture the dynamic correlations between the excess
equity return and the real interest rate (calculated as the one-month bill yield minus the log
difference in the non-seasonally-adjusted CPI). The VAR will therefore include these two
variablesata minimum,pluswhateverotherinformationvariablesareusefulforforecasting
them. In their original work, which analyzed the period ending in February 1987, Campbell
and Ammer (1993) used a six-variable one-lag system that included, besides the real rate
and equity return: the relative bill rate (deﬁned as the three-month bill rate minus its 12-
month lagged moving average), the change in the bill rate, the (smoothed) dividend price
ratio, and a measure of the slope of the yield curve.
A slightly different speciﬁcation works somewhat better in terms of adjusted R2 in the
more recent period, however. In particular, the yield spread and the change in the T-bill
rate, which were useful predictors of equity returns prior to 1987, appear less informa-
tive after 1989; consequently these two variables were dropped from the VAR, in favor
of year-over-year CPI inﬂation, which seems to have some marginal predictive power for
stock returns. None of these variables is subject to historical revisions, and consequently
represent information that would have been available to investors in real time.
Table 3 reports the estimated parameters from the one-lag ﬁve-variable VAR just de-
scribed. The adjusted R2 for the excess return equation of 0.0526 (excluding the effects of
the three crisis dummies, which jointly account for nearly 16 percent of excess return vari-
ance), is hardly overwhelming, but shows that there is at least some predictability in excess
returns. The only regressor signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels is the relative bill
14A useful check on the Campbell-Ammer procedure would be to compare its implied dividend forecasts
with the observed behavior of dividends. Such a comparison is beyond the scope of the present paper,
however.
19Table 3: VAR parameter estimates
Equation
Excess Real YOY D/P Relative
Regressor return rate inﬂation ratio bill
Excess −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −2.75 0.22
return (0.40)( 2.22)( 0.54)( 38.6)( 2.99)
Real 0.30 0.46 −0.02 −1.29 −0.72
rate (0.34)( 9.33)( 3.36)( 1.08)( 0.58)
YOY −2.26 −0.18 0.97 1.79 0.90
inﬂation (1.48)( 2.03)( 108.4)( 0.86)( 0.42)
D/P 5.61 0.20 0.03 1.00 4.53
ratio (1.51)( 0.94)( 1.21)( 198.9)( 0.86)
Relative −8.24 −0.29 0.10 9.90 0.84
bill (3.73)( 2.34)( 7.48)( 3.30)( 26.9)
August −10.93 −0.50 0.07 0.06 0.42
1990 (2.43)( 1.96)( 2.47)( 0.09)( 0.06)
August −17.85 0.02 0.00 0.58 −1.04
1998 (3.96)( 0.08)( 0.16)( 0.95)( 0.16)
September −10.94 −0.55 0.01 1.04 −8.51
2001 (2.41)( 2.12)( 0.33)( 1.68)( 1.32)
¯ R2 overall 0.108 0.283 0.989 0.996 0.697
¯ R2 x crisis 0.053 0.272 0.988 0.996 0.697
Notes: The excess return is the monthly log return from the CRSP value-weighted index, less the
one-month Treasury bill rate. The sample is January 1973 through December 2002, with dummy
variables for August 1990, August 1998, and September 2001. The coefﬁcients (except those on the
own lags) in the D/P and relative bill rate regressions have been multiplied by 100 for readability.
The “overall” ¯ R2 includes the dummy variables’ contribution to the variance explained accounted
for by the regression; the “x crisis” ¯ R2 excludes the dummies’ effects. The estimated intercepts are
not reported.
20rate. The dividend-price ratio has the correct sign (positive), but signiﬁcant at only a 0.13
level; similarly, higher inﬂation is associated with a reduction in future stock returns, but
again the coefﬁcient is only signiﬁcant at the 0.14 level.
3.2 A variance decomposition of equity returns
Equation 6 expresses this month’s excess equity returns into three components, which may
be correlated with one another. The variance of the current excess return can therefore


















giving a sense of the relative contributions of news about real interest rates, dividends, and
expectedfuture excess returnstoﬂuctuationsin thecurrent excessreturn. The resultsof this
decomposition appear in table 4, both for the full 1973–2001 sample and for the subsample
beginning in May 1989 (corresponding to the period for which Fed funds futures are avail-
able). The columns labeled “total” show the total contribution, and those labeled “share”




Despite the differences in speciﬁcation and sample, the results for the 1973–2001 sam-
ple are very similar to those reported by Campbell and Ammer (1993) for their 1973–87
sample. In particular, the variance in expected future excess returns accounts for the lion’s
share of the variance of the current equity return: 95 percent, compared with Campbell
and Ammer’s 101 percent (both are statistically signiﬁcant). Dividends make a somewhat
larger (but less precisely estimated) contribution here than in the Campbell-Ammer results,
accounting for a marginally signiﬁcant 36 percent of the excess return variance, compared
21to a statistically signiﬁcant 14 percent in their study. In both cases, the contribution of the
real interest rate is negligible (0.7 and 3 percent respectively) and statistically insigniﬁcant.
These ﬁgures are in turn very similar to those for the truncated 1989–2001 subsample,
shown in the right-hand portion of the table. Clearly, the dynamics of equity excess returns
and real interest rates (and by implication the path of dividends) are relatively insensitive
to changes in the sample period or the model speciﬁcation.15
3.3 The effects of Fed funds surprises
The most straightforward way to analyze the impact of monetary policy within the frame-
work introduced above is to include the Fed funds surprises in the VAR as an exogenous
variable
zt+1 = Azt +φ ¯ ∆ ˆ ru
t+1+ε ∗
t+1 (9)
where φ is an n×1 vector capturing the contemporaneous response of the elements of
zt+1 to the unanticipated rate change period t +1. The new disturbance term ε ∗
t+1 is by
construction orthogonal to the funds rate surprise. This effectively breaks the VAR’s one-
month-ahead forecast error into a component having to do with news about monetary pol-
icy, φ ¯ ∆ ˆ ru
t+1 and an orthogonalcomponent incorporatinginformationaboutthingsother than
policy.
An important point is that because ∆ ˆ ru
t+1 represents a prediction error from a rational
forecast made at time t, it should be orthogonal to zt.16 Consistent estimates of both A
and φ can therefore be obtained by ﬁrst estimating the usual VAR (equation 7), and then
regressing the VAR’s one-step-ahead forecast errors on the funds rate surprises. Normally,
there would be no advantage to the two-step procedure over simply estimating equation
15Very similar results are also obtained from models with more lags, and with the three “outlier” observa-
tions included in the analysis.
16Krueger and Kuttner (1996)showed that in practice, the Fed funds futures prediction errors are generally
uncorrelated with lagged information.
22Table 4: Variance decomposition of excess equity returns
1973–2001 1989–2001
Total Share (%) Total Share (%)
Var(excess return) 19.51 3 .7
Var(dividends) 7.13 6 .46 .04 3 .9
(1.7)( 2.2)
Var(real rate) 0.73 .50 .10 .7
(1.2)( 1.3)
Var(future returns) 18.59 5 .01 2 .18 8 .1
(2.7)( 1.6)
−2 Cov(dividends, real rate) −2.8 −14.2 −0.4 −3.1
(1.0)( 0.6)
−2 Cov(dividends, future excess return) −7.7 −39.6 −3.0 −21.8
(0.8)( 0.4)
2 Cov(future excess return, real rate) 3.71 8 .81 .17 .8
(1.2)( 1.0)
¯ R2 from excess return equation 0.053 0.039
Notes: The equity return used is the CRSP value-weighted index. Parentheses contain t-statistics,
calculated using the delta method.
239 directly. But in our case, using the two-step procedure allows us to estimate the VAR
dynamics (i.e., the coefﬁcients in the A matrix) over a sample longer than the period for
which Fed funds futures are available.17 This will of course tend to improve the precision
of our estimates.
3.3.1 The dynamic response to funds rate surprises
Incorporating the Fed funds surprises into the VAR in this way allows us to do two things.
First, because it (partially) orthogonalizes the ε t forecast error, we can use it to calculate
the dynamic responses of the variables in the VAR to funds rate surprises. In particular,
the k-month response to a one-percentage-point surprise increase in the funds rate can be
expressed as Akφ . The response of each of the ﬁve variables in the model are calculated in
this way, and appear in ﬁgure 3.
The upper-left-hand panel of the ﬁgure displays the response of excess returns over
time. The initial decline of 9.1 percent (not shown, because of the difference in scale) is
followed by several months of small negative excess returns. But after six months, equities
start to exhibit small positive excess returns, peaking at 0.123 percent per month (1.5 per-
cent on an annual basis), and continuingfor several years. Thistendency for positiveexcess
returns to persist is apparent in the upper right-hand panel of the ﬁgure, which shows the
response of the dividend-price ratio. The initial decline in equity prices leads to an abrupt
increase in this ratio, which reverts gradually to its long-run level as equity prices rise.
The contractionary funds rate surprise also leads to a sizable increase in the relative bill
rate, which persists several months (by construction). The real interest rate initially de-
clines, however, because unexpected rate increases seem also to be associated with higher-
than-expected inﬂation (shown in the lower left panel). The change in the real rate then
17Faust, Swanson and Wright (2002) employed a similar trick: they estimate the VAR parameters over
the full sample, but choose an orthogonalization based on the response of interest rates over the post-1989
subsample.
24Figure 3: The estimated responses to monetary policy surprises
months after shock
excess equity return
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real interest rate

































Notes: Each panel represents the response to a 1 percent funds rate surprise, as deﬁned in
equation 4, calculated from the VAR using value-weighted CRSP returns and estimated
over the 1973–2001 sample. The initial (within-month) excess return response is not
shown, because of the large difference in scale. The responses are expressed in percent
per month.
25becomes a positive 0.03 percent (0.36 percent on an annual basis) in the subsequent month.
But again because inﬂation is increasing, the jump in the real interest rate is transitory.
Overall, the Fed funds surprise is associated with roughly a quarter-point rise in year-over-
year inﬂation at an 18-month horizon. This result is consistent with those of Goto and
Valkanov (2000), in the sense that monetary policy is, in effect, creating a negative con-
temporaneous correlation between inﬂation and excess equity returns.
The strong observed correlation between Fed funds surprises, excess returns and in-
ﬂation naturally raises the question of whether it is monetary policy per se that causes
the decline in stock prices, or the inﬂationary pressures to which the Fed is presumably re-
sponding. Thisambiguityis likelydue in part to the fact that our Fed funds surprises are not
orthogonalized, and thus are not purged of any endogenous response to economic condi-
tions.18 It is worth noting however that even the orthogonalized monetary policy shocks of
Goto and Valkanov (2000) generate a similar set of correlations between returns, inﬂation,
and the Fed funds rate.
3.3.2 Explaining the stock market’s reaction to Fed policy
The second thing this approach allows us to do is calculate the impact of the Fed funds
surprises on the discounted sums of expected future excess returns, interest rates, and div-
idends. And since it is these present values that are related to the current excess return
through equation 6, this provides a natural way to determine the source (or sources) of the
stock market’s reaction to monetary policy.
One way to assess policy’s effect on these discounted sums is simply to use the VAR to
calculate ˜ ed
t+1,˜ er
t+1, and ˜ e
y
t+1, which represent the revisions in expectations of the relevant
present values, and regress these variables in turn on ˆ ru
t+1. Although this would provide the
answer we are after, the standard errors would be misleading, as they would fail to take into
18Of course this ambiguity inherent in this approach is balanced by its independence from any speciﬁc set
of potentially controversial identifying assumptions.
26account the dependence of the ˜ es on the estimated parameters of the VAR.
An alternative way to do the same calculation is to write out the ˜ es in terms of the VAR
coefﬁcients. Taking ˜ e
y
t+1 as an example:
˜ e
y
t+1 = syρ A(1−ρ A)−1ε t+1 or
= syρ A(1−ρ A)−1(φ ¯ ∆ ˆ ru
t+1+ε ∗
t+1) .
The response of the present value of expected future excess returns to the FF surprise is
just
syρ A(1−ρ A)−1φ .
Thus, the response of expected future excess returns depends not only on the φ vector, but
also on the VAR dynamics represented by A. Similarly, the response of the present value
of current and expected future real returns is
sr(1−ρ A)−1φ ,
and the implied response of the present value of current and expected future dividends is
syφ +syρ A(1−ρ A)−1φ +sr(1−ρ A)−1φ
or alternatively
(sy+sr)(1−ρ A)−1φ .
The standard errors for these responses can be calculated in the usual way, using the delta
method.
The resultsofthese calculationsappear intable5. The toptworowsreporttheestimated
impacts of Fed funds shocks for our two broad market gauges, the S&P 500 and the CRSP
value-weighted index. The ﬁrst of the four columns is the impact on the current excess
return, corresponding to the initial point in the impulse response function shown in ﬁgure
27Table 5: The impact of monetary policy on dividends, interest rates, and future returns
Response of:
current excess future excess real interest
Index return, e
y
t+1 returns, ˜ e
y
t+1 rates, ˜ er
t+1 dividends, ˜ ed
t+1
S&P 500 composite −9.23 4.58 0.42 −4.23
(4.01)( 1.55)( 0.52)( 1.31)
CRSP value weighted −9.10 7.26 0.24 −1.61
(3.87)( 2.05)( 0.23)( 0.47)
CRSP manufacturing −8.83 5.39 0.46 −2.99
(3.64)( 2.42)( 0.82)( 1.72)
CRSP ﬁnancial −7.88 7.44 −0.03 −0.47
(2.38)( 2.63)( 0.06)( 0.22)
CRSP information −8.51 5.60 −0.10 −3.00
(3.26)( 2.56)( 0.19)( 1.53)
CRSP construction −15.83 12.19 −0.55 −4.19
(2.21)( 1.47)( 1.33)( 0.52)
CRSP retail −7.27 4.92 −0.18 −2.52
(2.20)( 1.70)( 0.38)( 1.33)
CRSP wholesale −4.29 2.57 0.03 −1.69
(1.56)( 1.14)( 0.06)( 1.13)
CRSP transportation −5.68 1.89 −0.42 −4.21
(1.17)( 0.51)( 0.89)( 0.95)
CRSP utilities −4.54 1.87 0.07 −4.21
(1.70)( 1.01)( 0.13)( 1.91)
CRSP services −9.71 7.53 0.18 −2.00
(2.96)( 2.08)( 0.27)( 0.58)
CRSP mining −2.00 0.03 0.04 −1.94
(0.50)( 0.01)( 0.08)( 0.47)
Notes: Parentheses contain t-statistics. The sample is January 1973 through December 2001 for the
S&P 500 and value-weighted indices. Due to data limitations, the sample begins in January 1975
for all the CRSPportfolios except construction; for that industry, the sample begins in January 1978.
283. The second through fourth columns show the impact of Fed funds surprises on the
discounted sums appearing on the right-hand side of equation 6.
For the CRSP value-weighted index, the effect of Fed funds surprises on the excess
return comes almost entirely through their impact on expected future excess returns. The
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of 7.26 accounts for nearly all of the −9.10 effect on the
current return, with only small and insigniﬁcant effects on the discounted sums of real rates
or dividends. The results are less clear-cut for the S&P returns, where the impact of the
funds rate shocks is relatively evenly split between dividends and expected future excess
returns. (The real interest rate effect remains small.)
This result is readily understood in terms of the impulse responses plotted in ﬁgure
3. Funds rate shocks are estimated to have a small, but highly persistent effect on excess
returns, whose discounted value (using a discount factor of 0.9962) essentially balances
the current-period gain or loss. The contribution of the real interest rate is small — partly
because of the lack of persistence, and partly because unexpected increases in the funds
rate are typically associated with higher-than-expected inﬂation. So, to the extent that Fed
funds shocks are followed by predictable changes in excess returns, the effects of monetary
policy will be attributed to its effects on future excess returns, rather than to dividends or
real interest rates.
This framework also allows us to say something about the reason for the differential
impact of monetary policy across industries, as documented in tables 1 and 2. A ﬁve-
variable one-lag VAR was estimated for each of the ten portfolios, in a speciﬁcation like
that used for the aggregate equity return. Data limitations, however, require a slightly later
starting date for the portfolio-level analysis, and the number of ﬁrms in each industry is
somewhat diminished.
Overall, the industry-level responses conﬁrm the earlier conclusion that most of the
stock market’s reaction to monetary policy comes through the its effect on future excess
29returns. The response of expected future excess returns to a surprise Fed funds increase
is positive, and for most portfolios, nearly equal in magnitude to the current equity return
response. Four of these are also signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; one is signiﬁcant at the 0.10
level. There is a marginally signifcant response of expected dividends for two industries,
manufacturing and utilities. And in no case is the impact on expected real interest rates
large or signiﬁcant.
4 Conclusions
One contributionof thisstudyhas been to documentthe strongresponse of the stockmarket
to unexpected monetary policy actions, using Fed funds futures data to gauge policy ex-
pectations. For the overall S&P 500 composite index, an unexpected 25 basis point rate cut
would typically lead to a 1.3 percent increase in stock prices. A second important ﬁnding
is that the reactions differ considerably across industries, with the most sensitive (construc-
tion) exhibiting twice the response of broad stock market aggregates. Other sectors, such
as utilities, mining, and wholesale trade are largely unaffected by policy actions.
A more difﬁcult question is why stock prices respond as they do to monetary policy —
whether through the effects on real interest rates, expected future dividends, or expected
future stock returns. The results presented in this paper showed, perhaps surprisingly, that
the reaction of equityprices to monetarypolicyisnot directlyattributableto policy’seffects
on the real interest rate. The reasons are twofold: ﬁrst, the contribution of real interest rate
variance is small to begin with; and second because funds rate increases are associated with
higher-than-expected inﬂation, monetary policy surprises have only a modest effect on real
rates. Similarly, the impact of policy on (the implied path) of expected future dividends
is generally quite small, although there is some evidence of a modest contribution in two
industries.
30Instead, the impact of monetary policy surprises on stock prices seems to come pri-
marily through its effects on expected future excess returns — i.e., the equity premium.
Exactly why policy should affect expected future returns is not clear, however. But the
observed correlation between policy and inﬂation surprises suggests that the effect could
be the result of inﬂation’s effect on the equity premium, rather than that of monetary policy
per se. This ﬁnding corroborates the connection between inﬂation, monetary policy, and
stock returns documented by Goto and Valkanov (2000), although it is fair to say neither
that paper nor this one has fully disentangled the precise nature of the linkages. Resolving
this issue is clearly an interesting topic for future research.
31Appendix: deriving equation 6
This appendix provides a brief sketch of the derivation of the log-linearized relationship
between the current excess return, expected future excess returns, dividend growth, and
real interest rates given in equation 6. The derivation roughly follows Campbell and Shiller
(1988) and Campbell (1991).




where P isthestockprice and D isthedividend. Takinglogsand lettinght+1 =ln(1+Ht+1)
yields:
ht+1 = ln(Pt+1+Dt)−ln(Pt) .
The next step is to derive a log-linear approximation to ln(Pt+1+Dt). One way to do this
is to ﬁrst-difference, and express the change in the log of the sum as the weighted sum of
the log differences
∆ ln(Pt+1+Dt) ≈ ρ∆ pt+1+(1−ρ )∆ dt
where ρ is the steady-state P/(D+P). “Integrating” this expression gives
ln(Pt+1+Dt) ≈ k+ρ pt+1+(1−ρ )dt ,
and substituting this into the expression for ht+1 and combining terms gives
ht+1 ≈ k−ρδ t+1+δ t +∆ dt (10)
≈ k+(1−ρ L−1)δ t +∆ dt .
The next step is to solve forward, giving





ρ i(ht+1+i−dt+i)−k/(1−ρ ) .











which corresponds to equation 1 in Campbell (1991).
32A breakdown of excess returns can then be derived by expressing the equity return ht+1
as the sum of a risk-free rate and an excess return
ht+1 = rt+1+yt+1 .
Because it is assumed thatrt+1 is knownat timet, the “excess return surprise” yt+1−Etyt+1
is the same as the overall return surprise ht+1−Etht+1. So the risk-free rate can be included























ρ i(Et+1−Et)∆ dt+1+i . (11)
Again, because Etrt+1 = rt+1, it doesn’t matter whether the summation involving the rs
begins at 0 or 1. Finally, letting e
y
t+1 represent the “excess return surprise” and replacing
the summations with the corresponding ˜ es yields equation 6.
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